In Claxton's essay, what would he say about the existence of innate creativity?

"And creativity is not innate.  Genius may have a small genetic elemebnt to it, but every day creativity is an acquired art" (Claxton).


Claxton clearly states that he doesn't put stock in the existence of innate imagination, but why exactly? This paragraph in particular doesn't really explain his thought process behind his conclusion.  After reading his other traits of creativity, I put together a few main reasons why I would think he backs up this statement.

1)  "Creativity is not one thing."  If creativity is not "one thing" than it would be hard for something, that is not a compartmentalized trait, to be innate in oneself.

2)  "Creativity does not have its own home in the brain."  When one discusses innate characteristics, they usually stipulate the preexisting cognitive ideas, hence, in the brain.

3)  "It [creativity] can be cultivated."  Creativity is not innate within some people, not does it simply grow with a the extra practice of certain things.  Creativity is a quality of the highest analytical learning, and with the efforts and work put into growing knowledge and ideas of fields of study, can be "cultivated" or grown as a quality of learning, not independent of itself, or inherent within certain people, although without a doubt, is more prevalent in some minds than others.

In Taylor's essay, why do you think Einstein favors imagination over knowledge?

"...I sometimes feel I am right but do not know it.  When two expeditions of scientists went to test my theory I was convinced they would confirm my theory.  I wasn't surprised when the results confirmed my intuition, but I would have been surprised had I been wrong.  I'm enough of an artist to draw freely on my imagination, which I think is more important than knowledge.  Knowledge is limited .  Imagination encircles the world."


I think Taylor highlights this predisposition of Einstein to favor imagination when she discusses the K/I (knowledge to imagination ratio) ratio, and the cultural characteristics of it.  The K/I ratio is time dependent, and culturally dependent.  For example, she sites Thomas Kuhn's paradigm shift as a catalyst for the imaginative heavy side of the K/I ratio.  When a theory, invention, or new artform is in its infancy, with the minority at its back, imagination is favored by the producers, because "common knowledge" is not yet "on board" with the revolution, or the shift.

While it makes perfect sense to attribute the accolades to imagination, as Einstein does, I would say that the intuition required to make such a leap forward was mere caused by a massive collaboration of knowledge, and the analytical ability to see the connections that very few could see before.  Call this intuition, creativity, or some other cognitive characteristic, but this "imaginative" ability to conceive what others could not can most likely be found on a rock solid foundation of amassed knowledge.

   How is the concept of beauty applicable to possibly “shallow” works of pop culture and propaganda today?

   

    In hindsight, this question kind of answers itself...the key to beauty, as far as Nehemas is concerned, is the promise of greater value, the suspicion of new lessons and possiblilities within the object of observation.  

    By stipulating pop culture and propaganda as "shallow" I have already shown how and why Nehemas would not classify these works as beautiful.  Catchy, interesting, annoying, and repetitively memorable are a few adjectives one might assign to propaganda, but not beautiful.  Propaganda especially lacks this depth, for a few reasons, but reasons that are actually quite logical.  In art specifically, artwork is created (usually) to convey a theme, themes, an idea, or convey the emotions, mindset, inispiration, etc, of the artist.  How can something with one specific goal be considered to have beauty or depth?  If uncle sam wants YOU, then you either accept or decline, or maybe think about it for a few seconds, until you have to open a door, tie your shoe, or engage in conversation, to name a few occupying tasks.   I would say that the circumstances behind the production of propaganda are its own limitations.  Even the biggest patriot, according to Nehemas' theory, would never consider this to be beautiful, unless they are constantly engaged and drawn into the boundless realm of entering the service or buying government bonds.

How does Nehemas’ idea of beauty play into artworld in particular?


Alexander Nehemas' specificity of his opinions on beauty is sometimes unclear, although I tried to draw a few general conclusions of my own regarding this matter.  Namely, the possibility of the application of his theory to nature.


We established that "beauty" in the eyes of Nehemas is the promise of happiness; it exists the moment that the viewer suspects that the object of his admiration has more to offer, more meaning, and more to be discovered. One might think that this is mainly applicable to art, for the reason that our familiarity with art allows us to draw parameters, in which we can then tell the depth of an object we view.  Can one do that with nature or other non-art?


My answer would be yes.  The value that one takes from Nehemas' described "aesthetic judgment" is the beginning to realizing the beauty of the point of observation.  He is vague on describing or limiting this "value" and he also acknowledges the negativity of using the concept of the "depth" of meaning in an object, stating that it implies a concrete bottom.  Nature and other non-art can draw on all of these qualities.  Nehemas also states that even after thoroughly learning about a beautiful thing, we can still call it beautiful, even though technically, it no longer is beautiful for us.  We can also find beauty in an object, by willing it's powerful affects on others.  In this regard, nature falls under the description.  We constantly strive to become closer (well, some of us) to nature, to paint, record, study, and even blockbuster nature.  In this way, our bottomless interest in nature, and our need to share it with others makes nature, quite possibly Nehemas' thoughts, to be beautiful.

     
We have discussed so many times, the art of Andy Warhol.  It seems that, at the very least, Danto and Carroll have mentioned his Brillo Box,  and possibly Dickie, and others as well.  Why? In my opinion, it is the aspect of ordinary objects that Warhol can make art.  In our constant discussion of defining art, what better to examine than a work of widely considered art, which, as far as content goes, should not be?  It is for this reason that many art critics look to the external factors in Warhol's work to fine tune their definitions or theories of defining art, or judging the quality of the artworld.

Carroll Q&A #2

Carroll's Narrative theory is based in linking candidates for art to legitimate predecessors.  How would this theory work for "animal art," or would it be applicable at all?

I personally think Carroll's theory does not apply to animal art.  The linkages Carroll supposes that we connect art candidates to is based on the presupposition that it is "legitimate." How do we know that it's legitimate?? Carroll is vague about this claim, although I can say with fairly strong  certainty that there is an implied premise that underlies this assertion that some art forms and styles are legitimate.  This premise would be that, one reason we can say with certainty that that work of art, or that style of art, is legit, is simply because we (humans) made it.  Humans created said art, and therefore, some humans do exist that have mastered the concepts of the art, and can distinguish it from non art, or even bad art.  In this case, living experts in cubism, for example, can claim it to be art, and a legitimate artform, because they created it, mastered it, and can distinguish it from other art or non art that seems similar to it.  

It is for this reason that I would say animal art does not apply to Carroll's theory.  Humans do not create Animal art, so how can we link new animal art to legitimate animal art, if we have not created it?  I would say that there is no way for humans to safely and confidently state that "this bird art" is art, because it is distinctly reminiscent of the classical form of "nest art forms" that the most artistic birds create.. I think Carroll's theory is exclusively applicable to human art, as it should be.

Carroll Q&A #1

How would Carroll answer the issue of circularity in his Narrative theory?


Carroll's Narrative theory lies in the concept of linking candidates of the artworld to their legitimate predecessors, through intelligent conversation, be it style, form, conversational rebuttal, content, or school of thought.

"The historical approach also differs form the Historical Definition of Art insofar as the former is not a definition.  A major virtue of the Historical Definition of art is that it calls attention to the importance of the artistic intention to promote acknowledged art regards" (Carroll, 452).

"At the same time, the historical approach avoids the most frequently cited pitfall of the Institutional Theory- specifically, the charge of circularity.  The reason for this is simple: circularity is a defect in definitions, not narratives" (Carroll, 452).

Carroll kind of maneuvers around the questionable circularity of his theory in a few ways- one, stipulating that his theory is not a definition, but thorough examination of the art in an attempt to promote it via "acknowledged art regards."  In this way, he avoids assigning a definition to his theory, which would make it much more suspect to circularity.  Well how can we trust that this narrative is doing the work, or others, justice, or a lack thereof?  Carroll supplies an answer for that as well.

"Thus, from an explanatory point of view, a historical narrative, when accurate, provides us with a compelling argument for classifying something like a Brakhage film as an artwork.  Indeed, given the details of such a narrative, supposing them to be historically accurate- it is difficult to imagine how else we might classify such an artifact" (Carroll, 452).

In this instance, Carroll presupposes that explanatory narratives are naturally accurate, if done properly, because, "artists and audiences must share certain understanding, namely, an understanding of art history, its practices, and the aims and purposes that underpin those practices."

The Artworld: Dickie vs. Danto

Dickie and Danto have many simmilarities in their views of the artworld.  However, the main difference, is that Danto includes the knowledge condition, and Dickie's does not.

Danto discusses the concept of contextual knowledge of the history of the artworld.  With greater knowledge comes a greater understanding of art, contextually speaking.  Danto elaborates upon this, and with this knowledge comes greater status and power within the art community.

Dickie however, discards this knowledge concept..I do think this would have greatly enhanced his definition.  Without the knowledge condition, his social institution, his artworld, and his definition of art, becomes almost opaque in its flexibility, and seems almost to be playing politics in some aspects of the definition, such as his examples of Cohen's argument of aesthetic appreciation, and his conditional clause of candidacy and conferred status, seemingly meaning the same thing.  I think the knowledge condition would have strengthened the structure, credibility, and quality in his artworld.

Dickie Q&A #2

1)      Even if art is mistakenly introduced into the artworld, Dickie states that the art itself can never leave the artworld.  What do you think?

      Dickie specifies that once art is introduced into the artworld, it cannot go back.  Art is conferred by any member of the artworld however, as Dickie states, even the common theater-goer is a member.  What if art that, by the standards of most people, is not art, is conferred by a member?  One would have art in the artworld, that is not art.  Dickie eventually evolves his debate into the subject of good art and bad art, as opposed to art and non art.  Would this art then simply be classified as bad art, or should it be removed from the artistic community? 

      I do think Dickie is right in this regard.  What would the purpose be of defining art if one person or one group of people could override it?  Defining art with the exemplary clause that art can be changed at the tip of a hat is contradictory and superfluous at best.  In this case, Dickie's view on the definition and conditions of conferring art stands to good reason.  

      

Dickie Q&A #1

1)      Dickie states that status is conferred in the artworld by means similar to a person being elected Rotary President, or gaining the status of “wise man” within the community.  Could he be implying that his institution relies more on societal pressure and hierarchy for structure, instead of adding more stringent conditions to his definition of art?

dk

df I think that this could be a legitimate tool of Dickie's.  He does make the point that his version of the artworld maintains legitimacy, while at the same time being open to "frivolous" art.  Perhaps Dickie is relying upon the members of the inner inner circle to keep the unspoken rules, and maintain the integrity of his social system.  Dickie does elaborate on the status of various members of the artworld, and even uses examples of how one might gain this status, such as, wise man of the town.  This somewhat unspoken yet largely universal consent by townspeople provides a plausible example of what Dickie's version of social justice and responsibility may be.  

      "My thesis is that, in a way analogous to the way in which a person is certified as qualified for office, or two persons acquire the status of common -law marriage within a legal system, or a person is elected president of the Rotary, or a person acquires the status of wise man within a community, so an artifact can acquire the status of candidate for appreciation within the social system called 'the artworld' " (Dickie, 432).  

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TA's Question on Dickie

On page 431 in our book, Dickie claims that institutional formality and rules for art “would threaten the freshness and exuberance of art.” In what ways would rules and formalities do this? In what ways could these things promote and sharpen creativity? Is it possible to conceive of art without a certain set of rules and expectations?


I think Dickie makes some good points in his reasoning, but leaves holes in his argument.  He does have a point in his remark about the threat to the "freshness and exuberance of art."  For example, new types and concepts of art may be hard pressed to emerge into the artworld, if said artworld was strictly structured.  Artists may be expected to cater to a certain style or critic that may boost the status of their work.  In this regard, institution formality is better off to be taken lightly, or without.  An absence of institutional formality could also sharpen creativity, in the sense that originality could prove invaluable, especially with the absence of formality.  In this way, artists would be truer to their vision of form and content, and remain less influenced by more powerful or established styles or artists.  


However, Dickie's argument leaves the question, how can one teach art if there is no rules or institution? For example, athletes learn a game by watching and observing the rules.  Aviators learn from the rules of flight, and so on.  While Dickie is right in the sense that an over indulgence on the rules may stunt creativity, you cannot learn anything without at least a semi structured view of the concept you are studying.  I think moderation, as far as the rules are concerned, is best for art, and perhaps this is what Dickie was implying.  But one cannot learn from something with no rules or guidelines. 

TA's Question on Hanslick and Kivy

Kivy seems to propose that the subject of music is the emotional quality it brings forth in us. This seems to contradict Hanslick, who holds that only things we can voice in words are content and the emotional/aesthetic qualities of music do not belong in this.

Hanslick seems to imply, though, that there is something in music that we simply cannot put into words. What do you think this might be? Do you think he's right, that there is something mysterious and inaccessible to us in music? Does Kivy's proposal of emotional content hold against Hanslick's thesis?


I think Hanslick in right in this particular assertion.  In most art, there is a distinction between form and substance.  As artists will use form to enhance and attract the eye of the viewer, it is the substance within the art that conveys the subject of the painting.  


"Wherever the "form" appears mentally inseparable from the 'substance,' there can be no question of an independent 'substance.'  Now, in music, substance and form, the subject and its working out, the image and the realised conception are mysteriously blended  in one undecomposable whole.  This complete fusion of substance and form is exclusively characteristic of music, and presents a sharp contrast to poetry, painting, and sculpture, inasmuch as these arts are capable of representing the same idea and the same event in different forms" (Hanslick, 219).  


Whenever we say that a painting conveys joy, we can point to the exalted faces of the people in the painting, or their upbeat body language.  As for music, we may call it joyous, but how so?  Hanslick suggests that the only reason today we assign terms and emotions to music, like 'joy' is because of ambiguity of what the subject and theme of music really is, and over time, the music that made us feel happy was called as such, and so on and so forth.  Much like the way we assigned numbers to their lexical definitions of today, we have assigned emotive expression to music, and upon further inspection, cannot provide a proof for our reasoning, other than, the music simply makes us happy.  As far as Kivy goes, I think he proves some very solid points.  Kivy analyzes music and emotion from a different angle, which makes a convincing argument, in a different fashion.  In a way, it almost coincides with Hanslick on some levels.  


"Music is customarliy described in terms very similar to those we use to describe the motion of the human body under the influence of such emotions as melancholy and cheerfulness.   Thus a musical phrase may leap joyously or droop or falter, like a person in motion.  To put it more generally, music is customarily described in terms of motion; and so the same descriptions we use to characterize it are frequently the ones we use to describe the visible motions of the human body in the expression of the garden-variety emotions' (Kivy, 632).  


If Kivy were, as we discussed in class, to make the distinction between temporal time, as it is in music, and spatial time, as it is for humans.  Without this distinction, Kivy's argument does not carry as much weight as it could, although the concept of defining time as a representation of music, and applying that same concept of time to the movement of humans for specific emotions is a clever way to imply that these emotions music can impress upon us are in fact real, and not simply ambiguous, as Hanslick says. However, in his last page, Kivy raises many good questions to his thesis, and ends with suggesting that there is a "black box" containing the inner workings of music is, and is meant to stay, a mystery.  While they do differ in opinions of music and how it conveys emotion and substance, both Kivy and Hanslick, be it ambiguity or mystery, comment on the certain grey area within music, that is not found in any other form of art.