TA's Question

Think back to the last time you played make-believe. Compare it to reading a book or enjoying some other narrative art-form. Are they completely the same? What are some similarities? Differences?


Similarities:  Similarities consist of, in my opinion, "suspending disbelief," in the sense that one must pretend, and the best imaginations create an entire game or world of make believe, because the better the logistics, the more emotional satisfaction one can derive from the experience.  


Differences:  These seem to lie in the length of imagination taken to produce a proper and entertaining world of make believe.  For example, many books or other works of fiction are successful because they can greatly assist in the configuration of your imaginative processes, through logistics of the make believe world in the book, characters that display very human like traits, and even imagery.  While these are provided as a good base in many works of fiction, simply playing make believe requires one's mind to do all of the leg work.  Whether that is more rewarding or not is up to interpretation, however, the differences are evident as far as the length one must go through, creating the world in make believe, and simply playing in one in a well written novel.

What are some potential problems surrounding Walton's quasi-emotions?

The best counter argument to Walton's theory (in my opinion) was one put forward by Glenn Hartz, stating, in short, that these emotions were not based on belief but almost as a subconscious, initiated by visual stimuli.

"He [Hartz] argues not that our responses to fiction are independent of belief, to be understood on the model of the startle effect, but that they are pre-conscious:  that real (as opposed to pretend) beliefs which are not consciously entertained are automatically generated by certain visual stimuli."

Hartz's ideas are very intriguing to say the least, and as I mentioned in my Q&A, it is probably a problem Walton could have avoided by using a different terminology for "quasi."

Walton would bring up a few points.  Among them being, the misuse of other physical related reactions, incorrectly stipulated to be fear, or simply that if they were to truly suspend belief than they would once again resort to the behavioral equivalent of someone in fear, and therefore call for help, fight or flee, etc. 

The misuse of other physical reactions to a physical work of fiction can sometimes be misconstrued to be legitimate or authentic fear.  For example, the adrenaline kick a person gets in the climax of a horror film could be described as fear, when it is simply adrenaline.  Being startled, surprised, or fearing other things can also be in Walton’s words, quasi emotions, or quasi fear. 

Fear of other things can be substituted for fear of or for fictional characters as well.  For example, one might be afraid of the dark, or the concept of mysterious origins, and misplace that as fear for the green slime.  Perhaps the fear of  the concept of being murdered is sparked by viewing a horror film in which a character is murdered.  

In Claxton's essay, what would he say about the existence of innate creativity?

"And creativity is not innate.  Genius may have a small genetic elemebnt to it, but every day creativity is an acquired art" (Claxton).


Claxton clearly states that he doesn't put stock in the existence of innate imagination, but why exactly? This paragraph in particular doesn't really explain his thought process behind his conclusion.  After reading his other traits of creativity, I put together a few main reasons why I would think he backs up this statement.

1)  "Creativity is not one thing."  If creativity is not "one thing" than it would be hard for something, that is not a compartmentalized trait, to be innate in oneself.

2)  "Creativity does not have its own home in the brain."  When one discusses innate characteristics, they usually stipulate the preexisting cognitive ideas, hence, in the brain.

3)  "It [creativity] can be cultivated."  Creativity is not innate within some people, not does it simply grow with a the extra practice of certain things.  Creativity is a quality of the highest analytical learning, and with the efforts and work put into growing knowledge and ideas of fields of study, can be "cultivated" or grown as a quality of learning, not independent of itself, or inherent within certain people, although without a doubt, is more prevalent in some minds than others.

In Taylor's essay, why do you think Einstein favors imagination over knowledge?

"...I sometimes feel I am right but do not know it.  When two expeditions of scientists went to test my theory I was convinced they would confirm my theory.  I wasn't surprised when the results confirmed my intuition, but I would have been surprised had I been wrong.  I'm enough of an artist to draw freely on my imagination, which I think is more important than knowledge.  Knowledge is limited .  Imagination encircles the world."


I think Taylor highlights this predisposition of Einstein to favor imagination when she discusses the K/I (knowledge to imagination ratio) ratio, and the cultural characteristics of it.  The K/I ratio is time dependent, and culturally dependent.  For example, she sites Thomas Kuhn's paradigm shift as a catalyst for the imaginative heavy side of the K/I ratio.  When a theory, invention, or new artform is in its infancy, with the minority at its back, imagination is favored by the producers, because "common knowledge" is not yet "on board" with the revolution, or the shift.

While it makes perfect sense to attribute the accolades to imagination, as Einstein does, I would say that the intuition required to make such a leap forward was mere caused by a massive collaboration of knowledge, and the analytical ability to see the connections that very few could see before.  Call this intuition, creativity, or some other cognitive characteristic, but this "imaginative" ability to conceive what others could not can most likely be found on a rock solid foundation of amassed knowledge.

   How is the concept of beauty applicable to possibly “shallow” works of pop culture and propaganda today?

   

    In hindsight, this question kind of answers itself...the key to beauty, as far as Nehemas is concerned, is the promise of greater value, the suspicion of new lessons and possiblilities within the object of observation.  

    By stipulating pop culture and propaganda as "shallow" I have already shown how and why Nehemas would not classify these works as beautiful.  Catchy, interesting, annoying, and repetitively memorable are a few adjectives one might assign to propaganda, but not beautiful.  Propaganda especially lacks this depth, for a few reasons, but reasons that are actually quite logical.  In art specifically, artwork is created (usually) to convey a theme, themes, an idea, or convey the emotions, mindset, inispiration, etc, of the artist.  How can something with one specific goal be considered to have beauty or depth?  If uncle sam wants YOU, then you either accept or decline, or maybe think about it for a few seconds, until you have to open a door, tie your shoe, or engage in conversation, to name a few occupying tasks.   I would say that the circumstances behind the production of propaganda are its own limitations.  Even the biggest patriot, according to Nehemas' theory, would never consider this to be beautiful, unless they are constantly engaged and drawn into the boundless realm of entering the service or buying government bonds.

How does Nehemas’ idea of beauty play into artworld in particular?


Alexander Nehemas' specificity of his opinions on beauty is sometimes unclear, although I tried to draw a few general conclusions of my own regarding this matter.  Namely, the possibility of the application of his theory to nature.


We established that "beauty" in the eyes of Nehemas is the promise of happiness; it exists the moment that the viewer suspects that the object of his admiration has more to offer, more meaning, and more to be discovered. One might think that this is mainly applicable to art, for the reason that our familiarity with art allows us to draw parameters, in which we can then tell the depth of an object we view.  Can one do that with nature or other non-art?


My answer would be yes.  The value that one takes from Nehemas' described "aesthetic judgment" is the beginning to realizing the beauty of the point of observation.  He is vague on describing or limiting this "value" and he also acknowledges the negativity of using the concept of the "depth" of meaning in an object, stating that it implies a concrete bottom.  Nature and other non-art can draw on all of these qualities.  Nehemas also states that even after thoroughly learning about a beautiful thing, we can still call it beautiful, even though technically, it no longer is beautiful for us.  We can also find beauty in an object, by willing it's powerful affects on others.  In this regard, nature falls under the description.  We constantly strive to become closer (well, some of us) to nature, to paint, record, study, and even blockbuster nature.  In this way, our bottomless interest in nature, and our need to share it with others makes nature, quite possibly Nehemas' thoughts, to be beautiful.