Carlson dismisses the landscape model, but for different reasons than the object model. While the object model was flawed to the point of a dichotomic dilemma (don't use it, or use it, and transfer said nature to artworld) , the landscape model simply does not qualify under the correct point of aspection, or fairly translate the natural landscape.
The landscape model, unlike the object model, is a representative style of art, the kind that Plato would consider to be a "mirror held up to nature." While some of the most famous landscape paintings are indeed of the majestic natural wonders of earth, Carlson elaborates on how this attempt to capture nature on a painting is not fair to nature, nor is observing one a good way at all to appreciate natural landscape.
"The model requires us to view the environment as if it were a static representation which is essentially "two dimensional." It requires the reduction of the environment to a scene or view. But what must be kept in mind is that the environment is not a scene, not a representation, not static and not two dimensional. The point is that the model requires the appreciation of the environment not as what it is and with the qualities it has, but rather as something which it is not and with qualities it does not have" (Carlson, 542).
Carlson concludes that the landscape model is instructive, as paintings can tell one a great deal about the details and functions of nature, but is is innapropriate to view the natural environment in this way. He even goes as far as to question the ethics of viewing nature in this way, although he stipulates the ethics of viewing natural environment in a less scathing manner. Carlson states that one usually thinks of landscape as a background. Even the word "landscape" today, in some cases, is shorthand for a background, on a powerpoint, or laptop. Like Dewey, Carlson believes that this landscape that is usually treated as unobtrusive background must be viewed as obtrusive foreground in order to be fully appreciated.
Sunday, March 25, 2012
Flaws of the Object Model
"It is clear that in addition to being historically important, the landscape model, like the object model, gives us at least initial guidelines as to what and how to appreciate in regard to nature" (Carlson, 541).
While Carlson reminds us that both models are still helpful in our understanding of nature, they are also incomplete. It was interesting to see the logic behind his dismissal of both models, as they were indeed different.
As far as the object model goes, Carlson uses the basic premise that humans know art because we made it; it follows that an intentionally made work of art may contain a point of focus, or foci, that humans observe, and objectify, in order to appreciate it aesthetically. In this way, humans manipulate an object of nature to form sculptures, paintings and the like. These objects usually represent themes metaphorically, as he states in his example of the Bird in Space, which radiates balance and grace. However, if one were to do the same with a piece of driftwood (a part of natural landscape) Carlson states that we have lost the indeterminate beauty of nature. "...if the attention is directed specifically to them, we have no longer what, by a curious limitation of the word, is called the love of nature" (Carlson, 539).
Carlson emphasizes the fact that upon using the object model to appreciate a natural item, the aesthetics behind one's observations shifts to the artworld, and away from the natural landscape. He uses the examples of "found art," discussed by Danto, and "artistic enfranchisement" that makes Warhol's Brillo Box different from the other millions of boxes. Carlson ends up putting a rather dichotomic spin on the object model; either do not use it to fully appreciate nature, or use it, and have the focal point of your observation drag the natural object into the artworld, thus rendering the original goal of observing natural landscape null.
"Questions of what and how to aesthetically appreciate are answered, of course, but in respect to art rather than nature; the appreciation of nature is lost in the shuffle" (Carlson, 540).
While Carlson reminds us that both models are still helpful in our understanding of nature, they are also incomplete. It was interesting to see the logic behind his dismissal of both models, as they were indeed different.
As far as the object model goes, Carlson uses the basic premise that humans know art because we made it; it follows that an intentionally made work of art may contain a point of focus, or foci, that humans observe, and objectify, in order to appreciate it aesthetically. In this way, humans manipulate an object of nature to form sculptures, paintings and the like. These objects usually represent themes metaphorically, as he states in his example of the Bird in Space, which radiates balance and grace. However, if one were to do the same with a piece of driftwood (a part of natural landscape) Carlson states that we have lost the indeterminate beauty of nature. "...if the attention is directed specifically to them, we have no longer what, by a curious limitation of the word, is called the love of nature" (Carlson, 539).
Carlson emphasizes the fact that upon using the object model to appreciate a natural item, the aesthetics behind one's observations shifts to the artworld, and away from the natural landscape. He uses the examples of "found art," discussed by Danto, and "artistic enfranchisement" that makes Warhol's Brillo Box different from the other millions of boxes. Carlson ends up putting a rather dichotomic spin on the object model; either do not use it to fully appreciate nature, or use it, and have the focal point of your observation drag the natural object into the artworld, thus rendering the original goal of observing natural landscape null.
"Questions of what and how to aesthetically appreciate are answered, of course, but in respect to art rather than nature; the appreciation of nature is lost in the shuffle" (Carlson, 540).
TA's Question on Carlson
Allen Carlson quotes Hepburn in saying that people who have the wrong sort of education or aren't in the right mindset to appreciate nature will either pay little heed to it or will look at it "the wrong way". Carlson seems to imply that for each setting there is a "right" mindset to have and way to view the landscape/ flower/ summer afternoon.
Is this true? Or is it possible that there are multiple "right" ways to view a natural environment? Or is there no "right" way and perhaps only shades of appreciation?
I think Carlson has a good point here. In the beginning of his writing, he discusses points of aspection. His main point here, is that one must look at different styles of art, or in this case, nature, in order to fully appreciate and take from the observation that one undergoes. I do not think Carlson implies that there is a right and wrong way to look at nature, or a style of art, merely that one should take into account the intents of the author, or creator, or in nature's case, the fact that there is no human creator. As he suggests through a quotation from Ziff, one would not "drink brandy the way you drink beer...".
"Works of different particular types have different kinds of boundaries, have different foci of aesthetic significance, and perhaps most important demand different acts of aspection" (Carlson, 538).
Carlson simply uses this theory of points of aspection to premise the fact that one must look for certain traits in the type of art they are viewing. For example, if one were to attend an art gallery exhibiting the latest contemporary works of modern formalists, preparation to observe colors and contours of lines would be necessary to fully enjoy the gallery. Carlson states that this is what one must do with nature, or must not do. As he states earlier, we know what to look for in art, because we as humans have created it. Nature on the other hand, was not created by humans, and has not the intentional landscape of a painting. He then bases this to state that, natural landscape has "indeterminate form." This premises the rest of his argument for dismissing the object theory and the landscape theory as being helpful, yet incomplete. While Carlson would not claim that there is but one right answer to a piece of art, or nature, he is suggesting that observing with the right mindset is key to fully understanding and appreciating art, or nature.
Is this true? Or is it possible that there are multiple "right" ways to view a natural environment? Or is there no "right" way and perhaps only shades of appreciation?
I think Carlson has a good point here. In the beginning of his writing, he discusses points of aspection. His main point here, is that one must look at different styles of art, or in this case, nature, in order to fully appreciate and take from the observation that one undergoes. I do not think Carlson implies that there is a right and wrong way to look at nature, or a style of art, merely that one should take into account the intents of the author, or creator, or in nature's case, the fact that there is no human creator. As he suggests through a quotation from Ziff, one would not "drink brandy the way you drink beer...".
"Works of different particular types have different kinds of boundaries, have different foci of aesthetic significance, and perhaps most important demand different acts of aspection" (Carlson, 538).
Carlson simply uses this theory of points of aspection to premise the fact that one must look for certain traits in the type of art they are viewing. For example, if one were to attend an art gallery exhibiting the latest contemporary works of modern formalists, preparation to observe colors and contours of lines would be necessary to fully enjoy the gallery. Carlson states that this is what one must do with nature, or must not do. As he states earlier, we know what to look for in art, because we as humans have created it. Nature on the other hand, was not created by humans, and has not the intentional landscape of a painting. He then bases this to state that, natural landscape has "indeterminate form." This premises the rest of his argument for dismissing the object theory and the landscape theory as being helpful, yet incomplete. While Carlson would not claim that there is but one right answer to a piece of art, or nature, he is suggesting that observing with the right mindset is key to fully understanding and appreciating art, or nature.
Sunday, March 4, 2012
The Contradictory Nature of Weitz
Morris Weitz argues that one cannot and should not attempt to define art. I have already discussed his circular reasoning in his premise/conclusion, that, defining the undefinable is illogical, art is undefinable, therefore, defining art is illogical. This argument begs the question, is art really undefinable? This circular reasoning is noticeable in a few other of Weitz's theories.
"Art, as the logic of the concept shows, has no set of necessary and sufficient properties, hence a theory of it is logically impossible and not merely factually difficult" (Weitz, 410).
While this shows his first instance of circularity with logic and defining art, another one is present as well. Weitz argues that it is illogical to define art. How then can he logically asses the "logic of the concept?" If art is as undefinable as he claims it to be, would it then be irrelevant? Weitz uses logic to build his definition of art that, there cannot be one, and then uses this as a tool to prove that any further definition of art, besides the idea that there is not one, is illogical. I would argue that the use of logic would be irrelevant in the first place, as he has used it fallaciously. The use of sound and valid logic to refute a definition of art would be appropriate, but Weitz's use of fallacious logic seems to imply that using logic in his reasoning at all could be unwarranted.
Weitz seems to use logic to help his case, and then point out how his biggest counter example is then illogical, and fallaciously at that. Weitz employs a convenient and fallacious use of logic to progress his argument, in which his premises rest on one another. If he is so adamant that art cannot be logically defined, than perhaps it is best that logic not be applied in the first place, for if it were truly applicable, logicians would have solved the many questions of art centuries ago. Surely, it is not that easy.
"Art, as the logic of the concept shows, has no set of necessary and sufficient properties, hence a theory of it is logically impossible and not merely factually difficult" (Weitz, 410).
While this shows his first instance of circularity with logic and defining art, another one is present as well. Weitz argues that it is illogical to define art. How then can he logically asses the "logic of the concept?" If art is as undefinable as he claims it to be, would it then be irrelevant? Weitz uses logic to build his definition of art that, there cannot be one, and then uses this as a tool to prove that any further definition of art, besides the idea that there is not one, is illogical. I would argue that the use of logic would be irrelevant in the first place, as he has used it fallaciously. The use of sound and valid logic to refute a definition of art would be appropriate, but Weitz's use of fallacious logic seems to imply that using logic in his reasoning at all could be unwarranted.
Weitz seems to use logic to help his case, and then point out how his biggest counter example is then illogical, and fallaciously at that. Weitz employs a convenient and fallacious use of logic to progress his argument, in which his premises rest on one another. If he is so adamant that art cannot be logically defined, than perhaps it is best that logic not be applied in the first place, for if it were truly applicable, logicians would have solved the many questions of art centuries ago. Surely, it is not that easy.
TA's Question on Weitz
On page 414 Weitz asserts that all conditions we previously may have felt as necessary for the definition of art can be denied. The most fundamental one he brings up is the idea that art must be an artifact, that is to say, human-made. He says that a piece of driftwood could sensibly be called a sculpture if we were so inclined.
Give reasons for and against the proposal that things, which are not human-made, could be called art. At which point do we call something human-made? (We make sculptures out of marble, but we don't make the marble, so could putting driftwood in a museum be sufficient to be called "human-made"?)
This claim could be argued with extremely different reasoning and results, depending on one's stipulated definition of "human-made." Weitz has a good point in his reasoning behind his dismissal of the artifact-based element in many definitions of art. Finding art in a piece of driftwood, as he says, could be considered as an appropriate counter example to those who include "artifacts" as a necessary part in their definition of art. However, I would argue that Weitz is incorrect in this instance.
As we stipulated in class, I would agree that the all it takes for a work of art to be human-made, is the manipulation of said natural or artificial material by a human. This is the definition of "human-made" that I would define to be an artifact, as an artifact is anything that's human-made. If this were to be the case, Weitz's argument with the piece of driftwood in a museum would still fall under the category of an artifact, in my opinion. The medium the driftwood is presented in has been manipulated, which makes it human-made, and in turn, an artifact.
In principle, the piece of driftwood being placed in a museum is no different from millions of other works that the great majority of people would classify as art. Michelangelo's statue of David is simply manipulated marble, which as Nicole points out, is definitely not human-made. In my opinion, the statue and the piece of driftwood are both human-made, and therefore artifacts. Of course, the driftwood is only manipulated in its medium of presentation, while the statue of David was manipulated in medium and form as well. Nonetheless, both natural elements, marble, and driftwood, were manipulated by humans and skillfully intended to convey aesthetic reactions from viewers.
Give reasons for and against the proposal that things, which are not human-made, could be called art. At which point do we call something human-made? (We make sculptures out of marble, but we don't make the marble, so could putting driftwood in a museum be sufficient to be called "human-made"?)
This claim could be argued with extremely different reasoning and results, depending on one's stipulated definition of "human-made." Weitz has a good point in his reasoning behind his dismissal of the artifact-based element in many definitions of art. Finding art in a piece of driftwood, as he says, could be considered as an appropriate counter example to those who include "artifacts" as a necessary part in their definition of art. However, I would argue that Weitz is incorrect in this instance.
As we stipulated in class, I would agree that the all it takes for a work of art to be human-made, is the manipulation of said natural or artificial material by a human. This is the definition of "human-made" that I would define to be an artifact, as an artifact is anything that's human-made. If this were to be the case, Weitz's argument with the piece of driftwood in a museum would still fall under the category of an artifact, in my opinion. The medium the driftwood is presented in has been manipulated, which makes it human-made, and in turn, an artifact.
In principle, the piece of driftwood being placed in a museum is no different from millions of other works that the great majority of people would classify as art. Michelangelo's statue of David is simply manipulated marble, which as Nicole points out, is definitely not human-made. In my opinion, the statue and the piece of driftwood are both human-made, and therefore artifacts. Of course, the driftwood is only manipulated in its medium of presentation, while the statue of David was manipulated in medium and form as well. Nonetheless, both natural elements, marble, and driftwood, were manipulated by humans and skillfully intended to convey aesthetic reactions from viewers.
If Weitz believes one cannot define art, who would he stipulate as being an art critic?
Despite the fact that Weitz claims one cannot and should not define art, I would argue that he would say critics do exist, and are actually a positive and progressive element to the art community. While he refutes the existence of a correct, real, definition of art, Weitz discusses the numerous theories over the years, calling them honorific definitions.
"In each of the great theories of art, whether correctly understood as honorific definitions or incorrectly accepted as real definitions, what is of the utmost importance are the reasons proffered in the argument for the respective theory, that is, the reasons given for the chosen or preferred criterion of excellence and evaluation...Thus, the role of theory is to define anything but to use the definitional form, almost epigrammatically, to pin-point a crucial recommendation to turn our attention once again to the plastic elements in painting" (Weitz, 415).
Weitz greatly values these theories. He asserts that these theories and criticisms foster healthy discussion of the qualities and criteria found in "great art." The trick is to look past the overarching theory of an honorific definition, and to focus on specific points or recommendations of the theories. These specific use of forms, unique use in mediums, or even a specific flair in the style of an artist's trade are to be singled out in discussion and theorizing, for it is these qualities that one can recognize in a great work of art, or in a great theory of aesthetic value. This in depth analysis of artistic works and theories are what Weitz would encourage. There is no doubt that he would greatly value the ability of critics, among other people, to seek out these specifications and to compare and contrast similarities that are found in great theories and great works of art.
"In each of the great theories of art, whether correctly understood as honorific definitions or incorrectly accepted as real definitions, what is of the utmost importance are the reasons proffered in the argument for the respective theory, that is, the reasons given for the chosen or preferred criterion of excellence and evaluation...Thus, the role of theory is to define anything but to use the definitional form, almost epigrammatically, to pin-point a crucial recommendation to turn our attention once again to the plastic elements in painting" (Weitz, 415).
Weitz greatly values these theories. He asserts that these theories and criticisms foster healthy discussion of the qualities and criteria found in "great art." The trick is to look past the overarching theory of an honorific definition, and to focus on specific points or recommendations of the theories. These specific use of forms, unique use in mediums, or even a specific flair in the style of an artist's trade are to be singled out in discussion and theorizing, for it is these qualities that one can recognize in a great work of art, or in a great theory of aesthetic value. This in depth analysis of artistic works and theories are what Weitz would encourage. There is no doubt that he would greatly value the ability of critics, among other people, to seek out these specifications and to compare and contrast similarities that are found in great theories and great works of art.
Is it fair/possible for Weitz to apply logical reasoning to art and aesthetic theory in his argument?
One of the reasons Morris Weitz gives for his assertion that one cannot and should not define art, is that the very processes of defining art are illogical.
"Aesthetic theory- all of it- is wrong in principle in thinking that a correct theory is possible because it radically misconstrues the logic of the concept of art...a logically vain attempt to define what cannot be defined, to state the necessary and sufficient properties of that which has no necessary and sufficient properties, to conceive the concept of art as closed when its very use reveals and demands its openness" (Weitz, 410-11).
Weitz does make a reasonably strong argument; it is true that attempting to define something that is undefinable would be contradictory, and therefore, illogical. However, his argument of the illogical nature of defining art and aesthetic theory rests solely on this premise, that it is impossible to define the undefinable. This begs the question though, is art truly undefinable? Weitz focuses the central theme of his paper on the concept of the inability to define art, or at least that all prior definitions have failed, and should not be attempted in the future. It would follow, that he would have reasonable grounds to use this contradictory style premise in his argument. Is that enough, though? Despite the fact that he spends much of his writing discussing this contradictory principle, the inference to the premise that, "art is undefinable," is surely questionable, or at the very least, circular in reason, regardless of the content of the premise.
As we discussed in class, I would agree that art can be defined, in a way that the definition is sufficient, yet preserves the ambiguity required for art and artists to create whatever products they wish, and present them in any medium they can imagine.
"Aesthetic theory- all of it- is wrong in principle in thinking that a correct theory is possible because it radically misconstrues the logic of the concept of art...a logically vain attempt to define what cannot be defined, to state the necessary and sufficient properties of that which has no necessary and sufficient properties, to conceive the concept of art as closed when its very use reveals and demands its openness" (Weitz, 410-11).
Weitz does make a reasonably strong argument; it is true that attempting to define something that is undefinable would be contradictory, and therefore, illogical. However, his argument of the illogical nature of defining art and aesthetic theory rests solely on this premise, that it is impossible to define the undefinable. This begs the question though, is art truly undefinable? Weitz focuses the central theme of his paper on the concept of the inability to define art, or at least that all prior definitions have failed, and should not be attempted in the future. It would follow, that he would have reasonable grounds to use this contradictory style premise in his argument. Is that enough, though? Despite the fact that he spends much of his writing discussing this contradictory principle, the inference to the premise that, "art is undefinable," is surely questionable, or at the very least, circular in reason, regardless of the content of the premise.
As we discussed in class, I would agree that art can be defined, in a way that the definition is sufficient, yet preserves the ambiguity required for art and artists to create whatever products they wish, and present them in any medium they can imagine.
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