TA's Question

Think back to the last time you played make-believe. Compare it to reading a book or enjoying some other narrative art-form. Are they completely the same? What are some similarities? Differences?


Similarities:  Similarities consist of, in my opinion, "suspending disbelief," in the sense that one must pretend, and the best imaginations create an entire game or world of make believe, because the better the logistics, the more emotional satisfaction one can derive from the experience.  


Differences:  These seem to lie in the length of imagination taken to produce a proper and entertaining world of make believe.  For example, many books or other works of fiction are successful because they can greatly assist in the configuration of your imaginative processes, through logistics of the make believe world in the book, characters that display very human like traits, and even imagery.  While these are provided as a good base in many works of fiction, simply playing make believe requires one's mind to do all of the leg work.  Whether that is more rewarding or not is up to interpretation, however, the differences are evident as far as the length one must go through, creating the world in make believe, and simply playing in one in a well written novel.

What are some potential problems surrounding Walton's quasi-emotions?

The best counter argument to Walton's theory (in my opinion) was one put forward by Glenn Hartz, stating, in short, that these emotions were not based on belief but almost as a subconscious, initiated by visual stimuli.

"He [Hartz] argues not that our responses to fiction are independent of belief, to be understood on the model of the startle effect, but that they are pre-conscious:  that real (as opposed to pretend) beliefs which are not consciously entertained are automatically generated by certain visual stimuli."

Hartz's ideas are very intriguing to say the least, and as I mentioned in my Q&A, it is probably a problem Walton could have avoided by using a different terminology for "quasi."

Walton would bring up a few points.  Among them being, the misuse of other physical related reactions, incorrectly stipulated to be fear, or simply that if they were to truly suspend belief than they would once again resort to the behavioral equivalent of someone in fear, and therefore call for help, fight or flee, etc. 

The misuse of other physical reactions to a physical work of fiction can sometimes be misconstrued to be legitimate or authentic fear.  For example, the adrenaline kick a person gets in the climax of a horror film could be described as fear, when it is simply adrenaline.  Being startled, surprised, or fearing other things can also be in Walton’s words, quasi emotions, or quasi fear. 

Fear of other things can be substituted for fear of or for fictional characters as well.  For example, one might be afraid of the dark, or the concept of mysterious origins, and misplace that as fear for the green slime.  Perhaps the fear of  the concept of being murdered is sparked by viewing a horror film in which a character is murdered.  

In Claxton's essay, what would he say about the existence of innate creativity?

"And creativity is not innate.  Genius may have a small genetic elemebnt to it, but every day creativity is an acquired art" (Claxton).


Claxton clearly states that he doesn't put stock in the existence of innate imagination, but why exactly? This paragraph in particular doesn't really explain his thought process behind his conclusion.  After reading his other traits of creativity, I put together a few main reasons why I would think he backs up this statement.

1)  "Creativity is not one thing."  If creativity is not "one thing" than it would be hard for something, that is not a compartmentalized trait, to be innate in oneself.

2)  "Creativity does not have its own home in the brain."  When one discusses innate characteristics, they usually stipulate the preexisting cognitive ideas, hence, in the brain.

3)  "It [creativity] can be cultivated."  Creativity is not innate within some people, not does it simply grow with a the extra practice of certain things.  Creativity is a quality of the highest analytical learning, and with the efforts and work put into growing knowledge and ideas of fields of study, can be "cultivated" or grown as a quality of learning, not independent of itself, or inherent within certain people, although without a doubt, is more prevalent in some minds than others.

In Taylor's essay, why do you think Einstein favors imagination over knowledge?

"...I sometimes feel I am right but do not know it.  When two expeditions of scientists went to test my theory I was convinced they would confirm my theory.  I wasn't surprised when the results confirmed my intuition, but I would have been surprised had I been wrong.  I'm enough of an artist to draw freely on my imagination, which I think is more important than knowledge.  Knowledge is limited .  Imagination encircles the world."


I think Taylor highlights this predisposition of Einstein to favor imagination when she discusses the K/I (knowledge to imagination ratio) ratio, and the cultural characteristics of it.  The K/I ratio is time dependent, and culturally dependent.  For example, she sites Thomas Kuhn's paradigm shift as a catalyst for the imaginative heavy side of the K/I ratio.  When a theory, invention, or new artform is in its infancy, with the minority at its back, imagination is favored by the producers, because "common knowledge" is not yet "on board" with the revolution, or the shift.

While it makes perfect sense to attribute the accolades to imagination, as Einstein does, I would say that the intuition required to make such a leap forward was mere caused by a massive collaboration of knowledge, and the analytical ability to see the connections that very few could see before.  Call this intuition, creativity, or some other cognitive characteristic, but this "imaginative" ability to conceive what others could not can most likely be found on a rock solid foundation of amassed knowledge.

   How is the concept of beauty applicable to possibly “shallow” works of pop culture and propaganda today?

   

    In hindsight, this question kind of answers itself...the key to beauty, as far as Nehemas is concerned, is the promise of greater value, the suspicion of new lessons and possiblilities within the object of observation.  

    By stipulating pop culture and propaganda as "shallow" I have already shown how and why Nehemas would not classify these works as beautiful.  Catchy, interesting, annoying, and repetitively memorable are a few adjectives one might assign to propaganda, but not beautiful.  Propaganda especially lacks this depth, for a few reasons, but reasons that are actually quite logical.  In art specifically, artwork is created (usually) to convey a theme, themes, an idea, or convey the emotions, mindset, inispiration, etc, of the artist.  How can something with one specific goal be considered to have beauty or depth?  If uncle sam wants YOU, then you either accept or decline, or maybe think about it for a few seconds, until you have to open a door, tie your shoe, or engage in conversation, to name a few occupying tasks.   I would say that the circumstances behind the production of propaganda are its own limitations.  Even the biggest patriot, according to Nehemas' theory, would never consider this to be beautiful, unless they are constantly engaged and drawn into the boundless realm of entering the service or buying government bonds.

How does Nehemas’ idea of beauty play into artworld in particular?


Alexander Nehemas' specificity of his opinions on beauty is sometimes unclear, although I tried to draw a few general conclusions of my own regarding this matter.  Namely, the possibility of the application of his theory to nature.


We established that "beauty" in the eyes of Nehemas is the promise of happiness; it exists the moment that the viewer suspects that the object of his admiration has more to offer, more meaning, and more to be discovered. One might think that this is mainly applicable to art, for the reason that our familiarity with art allows us to draw parameters, in which we can then tell the depth of an object we view.  Can one do that with nature or other non-art?


My answer would be yes.  The value that one takes from Nehemas' described "aesthetic judgment" is the beginning to realizing the beauty of the point of observation.  He is vague on describing or limiting this "value" and he also acknowledges the negativity of using the concept of the "depth" of meaning in an object, stating that it implies a concrete bottom.  Nature and other non-art can draw on all of these qualities.  Nehemas also states that even after thoroughly learning about a beautiful thing, we can still call it beautiful, even though technically, it no longer is beautiful for us.  We can also find beauty in an object, by willing it's powerful affects on others.  In this regard, nature falls under the description.  We constantly strive to become closer (well, some of us) to nature, to paint, record, study, and even blockbuster nature.  In this way, our bottomless interest in nature, and our need to share it with others makes nature, quite possibly Nehemas' thoughts, to be beautiful.

     
We have discussed so many times, the art of Andy Warhol.  It seems that, at the very least, Danto and Carroll have mentioned his Brillo Box,  and possibly Dickie, and others as well.  Why? In my opinion, it is the aspect of ordinary objects that Warhol can make art.  In our constant discussion of defining art, what better to examine than a work of widely considered art, which, as far as content goes, should not be?  It is for this reason that many art critics look to the external factors in Warhol's work to fine tune their definitions or theories of defining art, or judging the quality of the artworld.

Carroll Q&A #2

Carroll's Narrative theory is based in linking candidates for art to legitimate predecessors.  How would this theory work for "animal art," or would it be applicable at all?

I personally think Carroll's theory does not apply to animal art.  The linkages Carroll supposes that we connect art candidates to is based on the presupposition that it is "legitimate." How do we know that it's legitimate?? Carroll is vague about this claim, although I can say with fairly strong  certainty that there is an implied premise that underlies this assertion that some art forms and styles are legitimate.  This premise would be that, one reason we can say with certainty that that work of art, or that style of art, is legit, is simply because we (humans) made it.  Humans created said art, and therefore, some humans do exist that have mastered the concepts of the art, and can distinguish it from non art, or even bad art.  In this case, living experts in cubism, for example, can claim it to be art, and a legitimate artform, because they created it, mastered it, and can distinguish it from other art or non art that seems similar to it.  

It is for this reason that I would say animal art does not apply to Carroll's theory.  Humans do not create Animal art, so how can we link new animal art to legitimate animal art, if we have not created it?  I would say that there is no way for humans to safely and confidently state that "this bird art" is art, because it is distinctly reminiscent of the classical form of "nest art forms" that the most artistic birds create.. I think Carroll's theory is exclusively applicable to human art, as it should be.

Carroll Q&A #1

How would Carroll answer the issue of circularity in his Narrative theory?


Carroll's Narrative theory lies in the concept of linking candidates of the artworld to their legitimate predecessors, through intelligent conversation, be it style, form, conversational rebuttal, content, or school of thought.

"The historical approach also differs form the Historical Definition of Art insofar as the former is not a definition.  A major virtue of the Historical Definition of art is that it calls attention to the importance of the artistic intention to promote acknowledged art regards" (Carroll, 452).

"At the same time, the historical approach avoids the most frequently cited pitfall of the Institutional Theory- specifically, the charge of circularity.  The reason for this is simple: circularity is a defect in definitions, not narratives" (Carroll, 452).

Carroll kind of maneuvers around the questionable circularity of his theory in a few ways- one, stipulating that his theory is not a definition, but thorough examination of the art in an attempt to promote it via "acknowledged art regards."  In this way, he avoids assigning a definition to his theory, which would make it much more suspect to circularity.  Well how can we trust that this narrative is doing the work, or others, justice, or a lack thereof?  Carroll supplies an answer for that as well.

"Thus, from an explanatory point of view, a historical narrative, when accurate, provides us with a compelling argument for classifying something like a Brakhage film as an artwork.  Indeed, given the details of such a narrative, supposing them to be historically accurate- it is difficult to imagine how else we might classify such an artifact" (Carroll, 452).

In this instance, Carroll presupposes that explanatory narratives are naturally accurate, if done properly, because, "artists and audiences must share certain understanding, namely, an understanding of art history, its practices, and the aims and purposes that underpin those practices."

The Artworld: Dickie vs. Danto

Dickie and Danto have many simmilarities in their views of the artworld.  However, the main difference, is that Danto includes the knowledge condition, and Dickie's does not.

Danto discusses the concept of contextual knowledge of the history of the artworld.  With greater knowledge comes a greater understanding of art, contextually speaking.  Danto elaborates upon this, and with this knowledge comes greater status and power within the art community.

Dickie however, discards this knowledge concept..I do think this would have greatly enhanced his definition.  Without the knowledge condition, his social institution, his artworld, and his definition of art, becomes almost opaque in its flexibility, and seems almost to be playing politics in some aspects of the definition, such as his examples of Cohen's argument of aesthetic appreciation, and his conditional clause of candidacy and conferred status, seemingly meaning the same thing.  I think the knowledge condition would have strengthened the structure, credibility, and quality in his artworld.

Dickie Q&A #2

1)      Even if art is mistakenly introduced into the artworld, Dickie states that the art itself can never leave the artworld.  What do you think?

      Dickie specifies that once art is introduced into the artworld, it cannot go back.  Art is conferred by any member of the artworld however, as Dickie states, even the common theater-goer is a member.  What if art that, by the standards of most people, is not art, is conferred by a member?  One would have art in the artworld, that is not art.  Dickie eventually evolves his debate into the subject of good art and bad art, as opposed to art and non art.  Would this art then simply be classified as bad art, or should it be removed from the artistic community? 

      I do think Dickie is right in this regard.  What would the purpose be of defining art if one person or one group of people could override it?  Defining art with the exemplary clause that art can be changed at the tip of a hat is contradictory and superfluous at best.  In this case, Dickie's view on the definition and conditions of conferring art stands to good reason.  

      

Dickie Q&A #1

1)      Dickie states that status is conferred in the artworld by means similar to a person being elected Rotary President, or gaining the status of “wise man” within the community.  Could he be implying that his institution relies more on societal pressure and hierarchy for structure, instead of adding more stringent conditions to his definition of art?

dk

df I think that this could be a legitimate tool of Dickie's.  He does make the point that his version of the artworld maintains legitimacy, while at the same time being open to "frivolous" art.  Perhaps Dickie is relying upon the members of the inner inner circle to keep the unspoken rules, and maintain the integrity of his social system.  Dickie does elaborate on the status of various members of the artworld, and even uses examples of how one might gain this status, such as, wise man of the town.  This somewhat unspoken yet largely universal consent by townspeople provides a plausible example of what Dickie's version of social justice and responsibility may be.  

      "My thesis is that, in a way analogous to the way in which a person is certified as qualified for office, or two persons acquire the status of common -law marriage within a legal system, or a person is elected president of the Rotary, or a person acquires the status of wise man within a community, so an artifact can acquire the status of candidate for appreciation within the social system called 'the artworld' " (Dickie, 432).  

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TA's Question on Dickie

On page 431 in our book, Dickie claims that institutional formality and rules for art “would threaten the freshness and exuberance of art.” In what ways would rules and formalities do this? In what ways could these things promote and sharpen creativity? Is it possible to conceive of art without a certain set of rules and expectations?


I think Dickie makes some good points in his reasoning, but leaves holes in his argument.  He does have a point in his remark about the threat to the "freshness and exuberance of art."  For example, new types and concepts of art may be hard pressed to emerge into the artworld, if said artworld was strictly structured.  Artists may be expected to cater to a certain style or critic that may boost the status of their work.  In this regard, institution formality is better off to be taken lightly, or without.  An absence of institutional formality could also sharpen creativity, in the sense that originality could prove invaluable, especially with the absence of formality.  In this way, artists would be truer to their vision of form and content, and remain less influenced by more powerful or established styles or artists.  


However, Dickie's argument leaves the question, how can one teach art if there is no rules or institution? For example, athletes learn a game by watching and observing the rules.  Aviators learn from the rules of flight, and so on.  While Dickie is right in the sense that an over indulgence on the rules may stunt creativity, you cannot learn anything without at least a semi structured view of the concept you are studying.  I think moderation, as far as the rules are concerned, is best for art, and perhaps this is what Dickie was implying.  But one cannot learn from something with no rules or guidelines. 

TA's Question on Hanslick and Kivy

Kivy seems to propose that the subject of music is the emotional quality it brings forth in us. This seems to contradict Hanslick, who holds that only things we can voice in words are content and the emotional/aesthetic qualities of music do not belong in this.

Hanslick seems to imply, though, that there is something in music that we simply cannot put into words. What do you think this might be? Do you think he's right, that there is something mysterious and inaccessible to us in music? Does Kivy's proposal of emotional content hold against Hanslick's thesis?


I think Hanslick in right in this particular assertion.  In most art, there is a distinction between form and substance.  As artists will use form to enhance and attract the eye of the viewer, it is the substance within the art that conveys the subject of the painting.  


"Wherever the "form" appears mentally inseparable from the 'substance,' there can be no question of an independent 'substance.'  Now, in music, substance and form, the subject and its working out, the image and the realised conception are mysteriously blended  in one undecomposable whole.  This complete fusion of substance and form is exclusively characteristic of music, and presents a sharp contrast to poetry, painting, and sculpture, inasmuch as these arts are capable of representing the same idea and the same event in different forms" (Hanslick, 219).  


Whenever we say that a painting conveys joy, we can point to the exalted faces of the people in the painting, or their upbeat body language.  As for music, we may call it joyous, but how so?  Hanslick suggests that the only reason today we assign terms and emotions to music, like 'joy' is because of ambiguity of what the subject and theme of music really is, and over time, the music that made us feel happy was called as such, and so on and so forth.  Much like the way we assigned numbers to their lexical definitions of today, we have assigned emotive expression to music, and upon further inspection, cannot provide a proof for our reasoning, other than, the music simply makes us happy.  As far as Kivy goes, I think he proves some very solid points.  Kivy analyzes music and emotion from a different angle, which makes a convincing argument, in a different fashion.  In a way, it almost coincides with Hanslick on some levels.  


"Music is customarliy described in terms very similar to those we use to describe the motion of the human body under the influence of such emotions as melancholy and cheerfulness.   Thus a musical phrase may leap joyously or droop or falter, like a person in motion.  To put it more generally, music is customarily described in terms of motion; and so the same descriptions we use to characterize it are frequently the ones we use to describe the visible motions of the human body in the expression of the garden-variety emotions' (Kivy, 632).  


If Kivy were, as we discussed in class, to make the distinction between temporal time, as it is in music, and spatial time, as it is for humans.  Without this distinction, Kivy's argument does not carry as much weight as it could, although the concept of defining time as a representation of music, and applying that same concept of time to the movement of humans for specific emotions is a clever way to imply that these emotions music can impress upon us are in fact real, and not simply ambiguous, as Hanslick says. However, in his last page, Kivy raises many good questions to his thesis, and ends with suggesting that there is a "black box" containing the inner workings of music is, and is meant to stay, a mystery.  While they do differ in opinions of music and how it conveys emotion and substance, both Kivy and Hanslick, be it ambiguity or mystery, comment on the certain grey area within music, that is not found in any other form of art.

Flaws of the Landscape Model

Carlson dismisses the landscape model, but for different reasons than the object model.  While the object model was flawed to the point of a dichotomic dilemma (don't use it, or use it, and transfer said nature to artworld) , the landscape model simply does not qualify under the correct point of aspection, or fairly translate the natural landscape.

The landscape model, unlike the object model, is a representative style of art, the kind that Plato would consider to be a "mirror held up to nature."  While some of the most famous landscape paintings are indeed of the majestic natural wonders of earth, Carlson elaborates on how this attempt to capture nature on a painting is not fair to nature, nor is observing one a good way at all to appreciate natural landscape.

"The model requires us to view the environment as if it were a static representation which is essentially "two dimensional."  It requires the reduction of the environment to a scene or view.  But what must be kept in mind is that the environment is not a scene, not a representation, not static and not two dimensional.  The point is that the model requires the appreciation of the environment not as what it is and with the qualities it has, but rather as something which it is not and with qualities it does not have" (Carlson, 542).

Carlson concludes that the landscape model is instructive, as paintings can tell one a great deal about the details and functions of nature, but is is innapropriate to view the natural environment in this way.  He even goes as far as to question the ethics of viewing nature in this way, although he stipulates the ethics of viewing natural environment in a less scathing manner.  Carlson states that one usually thinks of landscape as a background.  Even the word "landscape" today, in some cases, is shorthand for a background, on a powerpoint, or laptop.  Like Dewey, Carlson believes that this landscape that is usually treated as unobtrusive background must be viewed as obtrusive foreground in order to be fully appreciated.

Flaws of the Object Model

"It is clear that in addition to being historically important, the landscape model, like the object model, gives us at least initial guidelines as to what and how to appreciate in regard to nature" (Carlson, 541).

While Carlson reminds us that both models are still helpful in our understanding of nature, they are also incomplete.  It was interesting to see the logic behind his dismissal of both models, as they were indeed different.

As far as the object model goes, Carlson uses the basic premise that humans know art because we made it;  it follows that an intentionally made work of art may contain a point of focus, or foci, that humans observe, and objectify, in order to appreciate it aesthetically.  In this way, humans manipulate an object of nature to form sculptures, paintings and the like.  These objects usually represent themes metaphorically, as he states in his example of the Bird in Space, which radiates balance and grace.  However, if one were to do the same with a piece of driftwood (a part of natural landscape) Carlson states that we have lost the indeterminate beauty of nature.  "...if the attention is directed specifically to them, we have no longer what, by a curious limitation of the word, is called the love of nature" (Carlson, 539).

Carlson emphasizes the fact that upon using the object model to appreciate a natural item, the aesthetics behind one's observations shifts to the artworld, and away from the natural landscape.  He uses the examples of "found art," discussed by Danto, and "artistic enfranchisement" that makes Warhol's Brillo Box different from the other millions of boxes.  Carlson ends up putting a rather dichotomic spin on the object model; either do not use it to fully appreciate nature, or use it, and have the focal point of your observation drag the natural object into the artworld, thus rendering the original goal of observing natural landscape null.

"Questions of what and how to aesthetically appreciate are answered, of course, but in respect to art rather than nature; the appreciation of nature is lost in the shuffle" (Carlson, 540).

TA's Question on Carlson

Allen Carlson quotes Hepburn in saying that people who have the wrong sort of education or aren't in the right mindset to appreciate nature will either pay little heed to it or will look at it "the wrong way". Carlson seems to imply that for each setting there is a "right" mindset to have and way to view the landscape/ flower/ summer afternoon. 

Is this true? Or is it possible that there are multiple "right" ways to view a natural environment? Or is there no "right" way and perhaps only shades of appreciation? 


I think Carlson has a good point here.  In the beginning of his writing, he discusses points of aspection.  His main point here, is that one must look at different styles of art, or in this case, nature, in order to fully appreciate and take from the observation that one undergoes.  I do not think Carlson implies that there is a right and wrong way to look at nature, or a style of art, merely that one should take into account the intents of the author, or creator, or in nature's case, the fact that there is no human creator.  As he suggests through a quotation from Ziff, one would not "drink brandy the way you drink beer...".

"Works of different particular types have different kinds of boundaries, have different foci of aesthetic significance, and perhaps most important demand different acts of aspection" (Carlson, 538).  

Carlson simply uses this theory of points of aspection to premise the fact that one must look for certain traits in the type of art they are viewing.  For example, if one were to attend an art gallery exhibiting the latest contemporary works of modern formalists, preparation to observe colors and contours of lines would be necessary to fully enjoy the gallery.  Carlson states that this is what one must do with nature, or must not do.  As he states earlier, we know what to look for in art, because we as humans have created it.  Nature on the other hand, was not created by humans, and has not the intentional landscape of a painting.  He then bases this to state that, natural landscape has "indeterminate form."  This premises the rest of his argument for dismissing the object theory and the landscape theory as being helpful, yet incomplete.  While Carlson would not claim that there is but one right answer to a piece of art, or nature, he is suggesting that observing with the right mindset is key to fully understanding and appreciating art, or nature.

The Contradictory Nature of Weitz

Morris Weitz argues that one cannot and should not attempt to define art.  I have already discussed his circular reasoning in his premise/conclusion, that, defining the undefinable is illogical, art is undefinable, therefore, defining art is illogical.  This argument begs the question, is art really undefinable?  This circular reasoning is noticeable in a few other of Weitz's theories.

"Art, as the logic of the concept shows, has no set of necessary and sufficient properties, hence a theory of it is logically impossible and not merely factually difficult" (Weitz, 410).

While this shows his first instance of circularity with logic and defining art, another one is present as well.  Weitz argues that it is illogical to define art.  How then can he logically asses the "logic of the concept?"  If art is as undefinable as he claims it to be, would it then be irrelevant?  Weitz uses logic to build his definition of art that, there cannot be one, and then uses this as a tool to prove that any further definition of art, besides the idea that there is not one, is illogical.  I would argue that the use of logic would be irrelevant in the first place, as he has used it fallaciously.  The use of sound and valid logic to refute a definition of art would be appropriate, but Weitz's use of fallacious logic seems to imply that using logic in his reasoning at all could be unwarranted.

 Weitz seems to use logic to help his case, and then point out how his biggest counter example is  then illogical, and fallaciously at that.  Weitz employs a convenient and fallacious use of logic to progress his argument, in which his premises rest on one another.  If he is so adamant that art cannot be logically defined, than perhaps it is best that logic not be applied in the first place, for if it were truly applicable, logicians would have solved the many questions of art centuries ago.  Surely, it is not that easy.

TA's Question on Weitz

On page 414 Weitz asserts that all conditions we previously may have felt as necessary for the definition of art can be denied. The most fundamental one he brings up is the idea that art must be an artifact, that is to say, human-made.  He says that a piece of driftwood could sensibly be called a sculpture if we were so inclined. 

Give reasons for and against the proposal that things, which are not human-made, could be called art. At which point do we call something human-made? (We make sculptures out of marble, but we don't make the marble, so could putting driftwood in a museum be sufficient to be called "human-made"?)


This claim could be argued with extremely different reasoning and results, depending on one's stipulated definition of "human-made."  Weitz has a good point in his reasoning behind his dismissal of the artifact-based element in many definitions of art.  Finding art in a piece of driftwood, as he says, could be considered as an appropriate counter example to those who include "artifacts" as a necessary part in their definition of art.  However, I would argue that Weitz is incorrect in this instance.


As we stipulated in class, I would agree that the all it takes for a work of art to be human-made, is the manipulation of said natural or artificial material by a human.  This is the definition of "human-made" that I would define to be an artifact, as an artifact is anything that's human-made.  If this were to be the case, Weitz's argument with the piece of driftwood in a museum would still fall under the category of an artifact, in my opinion.  The medium the driftwood is presented in has been manipulated, which makes it human-made, and in turn, an artifact.  


In principle, the piece of driftwood being placed in a museum is no different from millions of other works that the great majority of people would classify as art.  Michelangelo's statue of David is simply manipulated marble, which as Nicole points out, is definitely not human-made.  In my opinion, the statue and the piece of driftwood are both human-made, and therefore artifacts.  Of course, the driftwood is only manipulated in its medium of presentation, while the statue of David was manipulated in medium and form as well.  Nonetheless, both natural elements, marble, and driftwood, were manipulated by humans and skillfully intended to convey aesthetic reactions from viewers.  

If Weitz believes one cannot define art, who would he stipulate as being an art critic?

Despite the fact that Weitz claims one cannot and should not define art, I would argue that he would say critics do exist, and are actually a positive and progressive element to the art community.  While he refutes the existence of a correct, real, definition of art, Weitz discusses the numerous theories over the years, calling them honorific definitions.

 "In each of the great theories of art, whether correctly understood as honorific definitions or incorrectly accepted as real definitions, what is of the utmost importance are the reasons proffered in the argument for the respective theory, that is, the reasons given for the chosen or preferred criterion of excellence and evaluation...Thus, the role of theory is to define anything but to use the definitional form, almost epigrammatically, to pin-point a crucial recommendation to turn our attention once again to the plastic elements in painting" (Weitz, 415).

Weitz greatly values these theories.  He asserts that these theories and criticisms foster healthy discussion of the qualities and criteria found in "great art."  The trick is to look past the overarching theory of an honorific definition, and to focus on specific points or recommendations of the theories.  These specific use of forms, unique use in mediums, or even a specific flair in the style of an artist's trade are to be singled out in discussion and theorizing, for it is these qualities that one can recognize in a great work of art, or in a great theory of aesthetic value.  This in depth analysis of artistic works and theories are what Weitz would encourage.  There is no doubt that he would greatly value the ability of critics, among other people, to seek out these specifications and to compare and contrast similarities that are found in great theories and great works of art.

Is it fair/possible for Weitz to apply logical reasoning to art and aesthetic theory in his argument?

One of the reasons Morris Weitz gives for his assertion that one cannot and should not define art, is that the very processes of defining art are illogical.

"Aesthetic theory- all of it- is wrong in principle in thinking that a correct theory is possible because it radically misconstrues the logic of the concept of art...a logically vain attempt to define what cannot be defined, to state the necessary and sufficient properties of that which has no necessary and sufficient properties, to conceive the concept of art as closed when its very use reveals and demands its openness" (Weitz, 410-11).

Weitz does make a reasonably strong argument; it is true that attempting to define something that is undefinable would be contradictory, and therefore, illogical.  However, his argument of the illogical nature of defining art and aesthetic theory rests solely on this premise, that it is impossible to define the undefinable.  This begs the question though, is art truly undefinable?  Weitz focuses the central theme of his paper on the concept of the inability to define art, or at least that all prior definitions have failed, and should not be attempted in the future.  It would follow, that he would have reasonable grounds to use this contradictory style premise in his argument.  Is that enough, though?  Despite the fact that he spends much of his writing discussing this contradictory principle, the inference to the premise that, "art is undefinable," is surely questionable, or at the very least, circular in reason, regardless of the content of the premise.

As we discussed in class, I would agree that art can be defined, in a way that the definition is sufficient, yet preserves the ambiguity required for art and artists to create whatever products they wish, and present them in any medium they can imagine.

Bell on: Hume, Plato, and Tolstoy

Bell on Hume:  Bell presents an idea of a progressive form of Hume's ideal critic.  The main difference being this;  while Hume's true critics were depended on to convey the true values of art, Bell says otherwise.  While he certainly agrees that a select few can truly judge art for what it is worth, he says that no other person can enforce his or her view upon him.  Bell goes on to say that these critics can only point out subtleties in art that escape the casual observer.  And in shedding light on the intricacies of art, he says that through this can a critic help an observer redefine his view of the art.

Bell on Plato:  Much like Plato, Bell discusses his view of aesthetic emotion being, out of human life.  His term "significant form," certainly eludes to Plato's world of forms, the transcendent world of arts.  Bell and Plato both agree that art is in a realm altogether seperate from everyday emotions and everyday life.  Bell continues to describe this "kingdom," in which the experience of emotion and form will transport the viewer to said place, which brings us to his ultimate claim, reminiscent of Tolstoy.

Bell on Tolstoy:  Bell continues to expand upon the concept of the timelessness of art and the places that the world of art can take one, as it is not grounded in human life or human emotion.  He eventually leads to his statement that, "art might prove the world's salvation," (Bell, 269)  which screams Tolstoy.  It would only make sense that two people, who have Platonic views on the sperate realm of art, could see such a transcendent power of experience, proving the world's salvation.  In fact, seeing as Bell sees art as timeless, would that not prove, in his eyes at least, that the most unifying of all ideas on earth to be something that lasts forever?  Something that transcends culture, time, and generations of different peoples?  If you think about it, the salvation of the world only seems like the next logical step to take, for such philosophers as Tolstoy and Bell, who clearly value it so much as to place it beyond the grasp of normal human experience.

How does Bell present views that both favor and put down the average viewer of art?

In his writings, Clive Bell comes across as slightly high flown, to put it mildly, yet his lenience to accept that everyone can experience art is unlike many who share his same opinions about the realm of art.  

"They have their moments of pure ecstasy; but the moments are short and unsure.  Soon they fall back into the world of human interests and feel emotions, good no doubt, but inferior" (Bell, 268).

In this section Bell takes on a more Platonic view of ill equipped art observers, which seems as if it fits in more with his theories on the expertise it takes to truly and consistently recognize and judge the significant form, or absence thereof, in art.  He acknowledges a slight experience, but not one nearly as fulfilling as one of a seasoned artist or art critic.  

"For, to appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions" (Bell, 266).  

While Bell also implies a good understanding of the art itself to experience the aesthetic emotion to its fullest extent, this quotation takes a much more empathetic approach to the casual observer of art.  While the experience may be fleeting or inchoate, Bell acknowledges the ability of anyone to experience art, to at least a certain degree, unlike many of his predecessors.  He allows any person of any intellectual level to have the credit of being able to experience art, as it is truly an experience that relies on the individual emotions of the viewer, and little else.  

Why does Bell separate beauty and aesthetically pleasing art, and for what reasons?

"Clearly the word 'beauty' is used to connote the objects of quite distinguishable emotions, and that is a reason for not employing a term which would land me inevitably in confusions and misunderstandings with my readers" (Bell, 264).

Bell distinguishes beauty from aesthetic emotion and significant form, simply because of his views on the use of beauty in today's society.  While Bell clearly sees art and the emotion and forms involved as transcendent, we often use beauty to describe flowers, certain people, and the like.  All of which, by the way, are objects and people that we encounter in everyday life, in our everyday experiences.

While this is definitely a Dewey-esque view on beauty, it would make sense that Bell would see it the other way. Bell sees the significance of beauty as stipulated to be intertwined in nature and human beings, so it makes perfect sense that he distances himself from the use of the word, as it would be contradictory, for his views at least.

TA's Question on Bell

How does Clive Bell establish that the aesthetic world is a "world with emotions of its own" in which "the emotions of life find no place" (267)? Do you think he explains this fully? Can you think of reasons or examples as to why he is right/wrong?


Bell states, "We seem to have recognized intellectually the rightness of its forms without staying to fix our attention, and collect, as it were, their emotional significance.  If this were so, it would be permissible to inquire whether it was the forms themselves or our perception of their rightness and necessity that caused aesthetic emotion" (Bell, 266).  


Bell compares inherent recognition of forms to a mathmetician in the heat of his work.  Now, he goes on to imply that the forms themselves, much like mathematical equations, are timeless.  For the Pythagorean Theorem worked exactly for us as it did for Pythagoras.  He states that like this, great significant form is timeless, and not attached to any particular culture either.  In this way, of being devoid of time and human life, does he then make his otherworldly statements.  Bell elaborates on pure aesthetic emotion, which he thinks is much different from recalling previous experiences or feelings, and in this do we see light shed on the "peculiar" aesthetic emotion.  This is another premise to his conclusion that emotions are in a world of their own, and that they have no place in life.

The Compartmentalization of Art

"Compartmentalization of occupations and interests brings about separation of that mode of activity commonly called "practice" from insight, of imagination from executive doing, of significant purpose from work, of emotion from thought and doing.  Each of these has, too, its own place in which it must abide.  Those who write the anatomy of experience then suppose that these divisions inhere in the very constitution of human nature"  (Dewey, 301).

Dewey poses a few questions before his assertion on the compartmentalization of art, namely, why is the attempt to connect the higher and ideal things of experience with basic vital roots so often regarded as betrayal of their nature and denial of their virtue?  Why is there repulsion when the high achievements of fine art are brought into connection with common life?

Dewey states that the institution of mankind is a very disorganized; hence, stratifying social classes, and institutions for every group of ideas or endeavors.  Other ideas that have been compartmentalized are often regarded as good, and bad, or high, and low.  These include, materialistic and ideal, profane and spiritual, ect.  Dewey suggests that in our efforts to organize an incredibly disorganized world, we assign "correct" interpretations to everything, and eventually, these preordained compartments ensure the second-handness of our experiences.  Ethics, politics, business, religion, and art as well, in their private realms, shed the light of what they think is good and bad, valuable, and the opposite.

"Of much of our experience as it is actually lived under present economic and legal institutional conditions, it is only true that these separations hold.  Only occasionally in the lives of many are the senses fraught with the sentiment that comes from deep realization...we undergo sensations...without having a sense of the reality that is in them and behind them...we see without feeling; we hear, but only a second-hand report, second hand because not reenforced by vision" (Dewey, 301).

TA's Question on Dewey

Consider what Dewey has to say about the human experience, emotions, and the influence art has on these. Following Dewey's logic, what implications does capitalism then have not only on art, but on the human psyche and even humanity in general?
Do you think he has a point?
Give a possible solution to this dilemma.


Dewey's definitions of an experience say a lot about his opinions on human experience, emotions, and the influence of art.  He talks about the fulfillment and lasting experiences of "real experiences."  He speaks of the influence of art as indelible instances in our memory, ones which we constantly recall upon. 


"The growth of capitalism has been a powerful influence in the development of the museum as the proper home of works of art, and in the promotion of the idea that they are apart from the common life...These things reflect and establish superior cultural status, while their segregation from the common life reflects the fact that they are not part of a native and spontaneous culture...The mobility of trade and of populations, due to the economic system, has weakened or destroyed the connection between works of art and genius loci of which they were once the natural expression"(Dewey, 299).


I think that the continuity, flow, and beauty of origins that Dewey favors in a true experience of art is lost in the economic and societal battle for approval in the world of "fine art."  The original beauty is lost when the most expensive art is collected, setting a bar based on wealth, and a culture based on the power of the groups of individuals collecting the art. 


With that being said, I do not think Dewey is referring to museums of natural history, merely museums of fine art.  I also think that any solution, no matter how practical, would be futile, however unfortunate that may be.  Our globalized world gets smaller and smaller every day, and the only common denominator of who gets what, and what is "fine art," and what is not, is money and power.  Attempting to "deregulate" such museums, collections, and galleries would be very difficult.  For the sake of the argument, I would say that the best solution to the problem would be lower the economic barriers to the fine art.  By making fine art and "common" art available to anyone, without difficulty, the general population would once again be able to decipher for itself the beauty of art, without being biased or predisposed to what the art is worth, or where it is being showed or displayed.

How would Dewey view the pop culture of our art world today?

Dewey has a skeptical view of the industrialization of art, with good reason.  He states that artists are not meant to produce on demand, and that the mechanization of art pushes individualism and other unique traits to the side. However, he does include that this pressure pushes some artists to become more individualistic, which cannot be a bad thing.

"Because of changes in industrial conditions the artist has been pushed to one side form the main streams of active interest.  Industry has been mechanized and an artist cannot work mechanically for mass productions...A peculiar esthetic 'individualism' results.  Artist find it incumbent upon them to betake themselves to their work as an isolated means of 'self expression'...Consequently artistic products take on to a still greater degree the air of something independent and esoteric" (Dewey, 299).

Dewey makes an interesting point here, that perhaps the industrialization of art causes artists to become so wrapped up in their individuality, that their works can convey less and less meaning to the average viewer.  Nevertheless, Dewey frowns upon such mass production;  I think he would be somewhat skeptical of the pop culture of art today, especially music.  For as many artists that can be heard all over the country, on every radio station, there are genres and composers that apply to a very few select group of people.

How would Dewey place values on "productive" art, versus purely aesthetic art?

Unlike many before him, Dewey does not view the human perception as an imperfect "intellectual telescope," meaning that he doesn't think the viewing of aesthetic art without intellectual value is the right question to ask to begin with.  He is much more clear about the experience of the viewer, as opposed to the content he or she is actually viewing.  He describes an experience as, "when the material experienced runs its course in fulfillment...Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency.  It is an experience" (Dewey, 305).

It is clear that Dewey does not address the value of purely aesthetic art, because he does not view the human eye as a filter for intellectualism.  This is not the angle, nor the question, that Dewey addresses when examining art.  "Art as Experience," is, in fact, the art that we experience in every day life, and in defining the "real experiences," from the incomplete ones, Dewey sheds light on my question in his own unique way.

" 'real experiences'; those things of which we say in recalling them, 'that was an experience.'  It may have been something of tremendous importance...Or it may have been something that in comparison was slight- and which perhaps because of its very slightness illustrates all the better what is is to be an experience" (Dewey, 305).

Views on Religion and Art: Tolstoy vs. Hume

In his work, Tolstoy seemed fond of the idea that art would unite a universal brotherhood.  He also explains that the only way this artistic progress can be made is by creating art within the religion based flow of ideas.  Now, Tolstoy defines religion as more of living a humanitarian lifestyle, but all the same, dictates that art without religious perception is counterproductive.  

Hume has much different views on the subject, although, like most of his words, focuses more on the legitimate merit of art in general.  His ideas of religious influence on art is much different than Tolstoy.

"Religious principles are also a blemish in any polite composition, when they rise up to superstition, and intrude themselves into every sentiment, however remote from any connection with religion" (Hume, 112).  

When Hume is explaining what makes a good critic, he includes a well learned person, especially one no biased or jaded by a lifetime of influence by one culture in particular.  He says that a person too predisposed to one culture in particular cannot judge art from another, and would tend to favor art with nuances from his or her heritage.  I think Hume is classifying religion as such, an element of culture, and with that being said, sees the religious metaphors in art as bias towards one culture over another, and therefore, makes the artist or critic unable to fairly judge the art with art from around the world. 

TA's Question on Hume

On page 106, Hume says that great poets like Homer were praised in the time they were writing and are still highly praised today. Perhaps even more highly regarded because of their longevity. There are countless works of art that we understand to be great coming from their time and because they have stood the test of time.

My question is, what if Homer's Iliad and Odyssey had been written not thousands of years ago, but in this day and age? Disregarding that literature would be very different because of it, and assuming they were written as exactly the same pieces, how would we react? How would we react according to Hume's logic?


I think one would first have to establish more ground rules for this thought.  I think that a few of the biggest reasons that the Iliad and Odyssey are so revered are the fact that they taught lessons, and captivated the cultural essence of their times.  They were also very original and groundbreaking works.  I think the literary mastery was icing on the cake, so, to answer the question, they may not be as renowned today if they were published tomorrow.  


With that being said, more appropriately, it would be a question one could not answer.  Simply because of the fact that they catered to the culture of their specific time, and were highly original.  If we were to contemplate their entry into the world of art today, wouldn't they be skimming of the works of a few other bodies of literature, at the very least?  Would it be slightly odd to right about the beliefs and stories that no one really holds today?  And if not, how would we take it at face value? As a cultural fingerprint or merely entertainment?  I think it would be difficult to recreate a scenario like that in our minds, but if we were, and under the assumption that they were the precedent to any other works that were to be built off of them, I would say, that Hume would think the true value of the art would show, and over time, at least, the world would accept the art for what it was, and is.  

How would Hume defend his idea of a universal taste to cultural and societal evolution?

Hume offers a quite satisfying explanation for the changes of taste or judgement over time, by saying that these changes were not specifically correct judgments in the first place.  He can accredit the aesthetic value to a work of art, but says that these fads will come and go over time, and that time alone will reveal the true art, and the true critics.

"Just expressions of passion and nature are sure, after a little time to gain public applause, which they maintain for ever.  Aristotle, and Plato, and Epicurus, and Descartes, may successively yield to each other:  But Terence and Virgil maintain an universal, undisputed empire over the minds of men" (Hume, 110).

Hume explains that we will always have art of passion and significance, and they will succeed each other over time, yet true works of merit will stand the test of time.  He states later, that this especially proves to be true when some significant works with both aesthetic appeal and true value are created; one part eventually falls away, yet the other, remains, an aspect of praise.  This is a very good example of how Hume would distinguish what is truly good art.

"The abstract philosophy of Cicero has lost its credit:  The vehemence of his oratory is still the object of our admiration" (Hume, 110).

What would Hume say to two “critics,” who blatantly disagreed on a profound piece of art?

This may be the best counter example to Hume's definitions of art and the viewers of art.  As we talked about it in class, there seems to be a hint of circular reasoning on his (Hume's) part, which begs the questions; how can one tell a critic is good?... Because he judges classic art favorably... and this classical art was first deemed favorable by a "good" critic in the first place..

"Thus, though the principles of taste be universal, and , nearly, if not entirely the same in all men; yet few are qualified to give judgment on any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty...Though men of delicate taste be rare, they are easily to be distinguished in society, by the soundness of their understanding and the superiority of their faculties above the rest of mankind" (Hume, 109-10).

With that being said, how can society distinguish one person's view of art as superior, when so few are qualified to give judgement in the first place?  Hume says that society will eventually dictate the true critics from the false ones, yet also says that these same men approving one man cannot truly judge the art for themselves.  And what of the original art?  Hume often refers to the works of Aristotle, Plato, Epicurus, and Descartes, as literature that will stand the test of time, as truly good art.  Yet who deemed it so in the first place?  His explanation somewhat skirts the matter by offering answer A for question B, and then offering that  question B (explanation) for the clarification of answer A.   While I greatly admired most of Hume's opinions on art, I did find this one instance in particular somewhat questionable.

Wrapping Up Tolstoy

So far in class this semester, we have analyzed two individuals with two different opinions on art.  While they both provide valuable insight as to what art might and could be, I couldn't help but notice that we concluded Plato's assertions to be somewhat shallow, and Tolstoy to be a novelist, merely dabbling in philosophy, however impressive his work was.  One thing I think everyone can take from Tolstoy's work, was his opinion that art provides a medium of communication that can succeed in bring people together.

Art, or good art, can bring out a common denominator among groups of people that possibly would have nothing else in common.  While Tolstoy never really explains the option of a moving piece of art in which the intention is different from a dramatic reception, his view that art can bring many diverse crowds together is something that I'm sure happens every day.

Despite the fact that Tolstoy calls for use of specific emotion in art, which is different than Plato’s views, how are they similar in other regards?

"And in order to do that it is primarily necessary to examine that activity in itself, in its dependence on its causes, and in connection with its effects, and not merely in relation to the pleasure we can get from it" (Tolstoy, 234).

While Tolstoy exhibits many differences in his opinions on art than Plato does, I did see a connection, in the fact that both place skeptism on the idea of art for pure aesthetic pleasure.  While Plato is much more critical of purely aesthetic art, Tolstoy too sees that there may be a misconception behind the reasons and motives of creating art for the sole purpose of aesthetic beauty.

"Just as people who conceive the aim and purpose of food to be pleasure cannot recognize the real meaning of eating, so people who consider the aim of art to be pleasure cannot realize its true meaning and purpose..." (Tolstoy, 235).

Just as many philosophers in the past have stated, that food for the mind is equally as important as food for the body, and that one cannot truly appreciate the pleasure of eating food (literally) before they also realize the value of its nourishment, Tolstoy makes the point that art is like food.  One can only appreciate the aesthetic pleasure of art if only at first they realize the art's intellectual or symbolic value.

Tolstoy says that our art should be “appraised on the basis of that religious perception”; why then does he frown upon the “so-called Renaissance”?

"The chief mistake made by people of the upper classes of the time of the so-called Renaissance - a mistake which we still perpetuate- was not that they ceased to value and to attach importance to religious art (people of that period could not attach importance to it, because, like out own upper classes, they could not believe in what the majority considered to be religion)" (Tolstoy, 242).

I think Tolstoy was trying to say that, while he thinks art can only make progress through religious perception, the most powerful people of the Renaissance did not continue that progress.  Tolstoy always talks about how art will bring mankind together, to eventually, form a universal brotherhood.  While he also states that art can only attain this type of unity and progress through religious perception, he also knows that art in which religion is used as a vehicle to create does not always entail that it coincides with the best perception of the time.  Tolstoy used the Renaissance as his example.

He says that while the art had a certain religious aspect, the audience, mostly the upper classes, was quite limited and did not convey religious meaning that the general public shared at the time.  Therefore, while the art was very religiously influenced, he deemed it bad art, because it failed to uphold the second part to his condition of progress towards the brotherhood; it failed to unify the people.  Tolstoy knew that religious art was only effective if it shared in the religious beliefs of the masses, not the fancies of the upper echelon.

TA's Q: How does artistic and creative quality figure in to Tolstoy's definition of art as a means to unite people and their emotions?

I think artistic and creative quality plays a major role in Tolstoy's definition of art, especially when you begin to measure the degrees and ramifications for, "infectiousness."  However, I agree with Nicole's earlier comment, that due to human empathy, perhaps even a touching story or tragedy reported in a newspaper could be considered art, providing the reader experiences the appropriate emotion invoked by the piece.

However, I think Tolstoy would say that there remains a difference.  In most newspapers, the writing is informative, or critical.  I would say that the journalist or reporter does not feel the raw emotion of say, a decorated war hero, that the soldier himself/herself would feel if they related the story directly to the reader.  While an empathetic reader may experience the emotions experienced by the source of the story itself, I feel as if the middle man, (the reporter), would break the bond of consciousness that Tolstoy describes as a facet of truly great art.  There is no doubt that perhaps the reporter, the source of the story, and the reader all experience similar emotions, however, I would say that by Tolstoy's definition of art at least, it would not be true art.

"So that by art, in the limited sense of the word, we do not mean all human activity transmitting feelings, but only that part which we for some reason select from it and to which we attach special importance" (Tolstoy, 237).

Art, for Art's Sake

Plato seems to be against art with no new value, deeming them, an "imitation of an imitation."  He does not mention that one could simply enjoy the aesthetic value of viewing art.  Why? I personally think that one reason Plato opposed imitative art was not only because he did not think that art had core value, but also because he was worried about the way that art could subliminally influence the viewer.  He gives this example in The Republic, when he notes the analogy of a stick thrust in water.  The stick seems bent, although upon extracting it from the water, one can clearly see the illusion that took place.  I think that observation has even more merit today.  Whether or not the subliminally influential media arts have a positive or negative effect on viewers, there is no doubt that in this day and age, we are completely surrounded by it.  From television, internet,  newspapers, radio, and our pop culture, I think Plato's warning has more significance now than ever before.

My question is, what about inventors? The person who came up with the couch, wheel, table, iPod? Does an "inventor" as such even exist?

I think Plato accredits inventors with the ingenuity to look inside their own soul.  Plato says in The Republic that by looking into our souls, we can see and grasp ideas from the world of forms.  While Plato may not actually call those people inventors, I would say that those people and their work would be the type of professions he valued the most, simply because they introduced products and ideas with original value, as far as the real, physical world is concerned.  However, I would say that he would not refer to them as inventors.  If Plato believed that every original idea came from the world of forms than that would imply the preexistence of everything created in the real, physical world.  While he may not acknowledge these inventors as actual "inventors," I think he certainly would speak highly of their productive nature and their valuable contributions to society.

How accurate was Plato’s assertion that painters “take a mirror, and turn it round in every direction” ?

When Plato makes his assertion that painters "take a mirror, and turn it round in every direction," how much credit can we give him for his words?  On one hand, the view that artists simply hold a mirror to whatever they are trying to depict is a somewhat shallow understanding of their trade.  On the other, I think Plato is trying to convey the sense that it takes little ingenuity to replicate the physical image of, say, a person, landscape, or anything else of that matter.  It would also be helpful to consider the art in that period of time.  Abstract art is a relatively new concept, so one would think, that perhaps a good deal of art in Plato's time was in fact simple portraits of scenes that already existed in the real, physical world.  While his mirror analogy is definitely a jaded view of art, perhaps the reader can see where Plato is coming from, and interpret his message in a more charitable light.

How did Plato regard certain “valuable,” forms of art, such as epics or Greek tragedies?

Plato expresses his concern that the arts, because they imitate an imitation, hold no individual value themselves.  How then does he feel about the art he was raised on, such as Greek tragedies and epics, most notably from Homer?  These forms of the arts were often used to set the moral and educational standards for the general public.  One would think that works of art that set moral and ethical codes would indeed have value, and Plato does acknowledge that to some degree.  In short, saying, that while we ourselves would never behave with the shameless lamentation demonstrated by a tragic hero, we can still learn from the overall value of the work as a whole, which is something he feels that most paintings and poems lack.

Philosophy Toolkit: Interpretive Charity

Interpretive Charity:  A preparedness to give others the benefit of the doubt, interpreting their statements in the best possible light and on the working assumption that their thoughts are valuable.  To interpret charitably is not to read or listen uncritically, but to be disinclined to condemn others' views except as a last resort.  It is the practical basis for civility in discourse, as well as prerequisite for grasping unfamiliar texts and approaches.

One Intellectual virtue I feel that is neglected the most by philosophy students is Interpretive Charity.  Interpretive  charity is essential to philosophers in many ways.  In philosophy, and logic especially, the words used and the order they are put in can radically change the conclusion of an argument.  Because of this delicate balance, it is important to follow the basic rules of an argument.  In short, resorting to presumptuous conclusions or strong emotive discourse can ruin the validity or integrity of an argument.

That being said, I feel that the incredible range of topics that students have at the tips of their fingers (via the internet) can leave them prone to, for example, the radical or reactionary opinions of a bitter journalist or blogger, or simply limited, stereotypical knowledge about a vast number of topics;  I think it is human nature to attempt to simplify and organize knowledge within our brains, and this has become increasingly difficult in a very complex  society.

 In conclusion,  I found interpretive charity an interesting topic in the Toolkit, for the following reasons:  In a subject that requires the arguer to abstain from emotive and personal (in a biased or contemptuous way) discourse,  the world we live in today surrounds us with influential media aimed to capture interest, not inform, and leads many simplified and unsubstantiated opinions about some of the world's most complex problems.  I think it is very important to use interpretive charity more often, as we are often ignorant of the value of a statement we do not understand.  We need to resist the urge to dismiss ideas we do not care for simply because they are complicated, or contradictory to our own.  

About Me

I am a freshman at MCLA, entering my second semester, and I am majoring in Political Science and History.  I very much enjoy baseball, playing the trumpet, snowboarding, lifting weights, and am blessed with a wonderful family and friends I enjoy spending time with.